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6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8
9 James Eagle,

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 Bill Alexander Automotive Center, Inc.,

13 Defendant.

No. CV 11-01148-PHX-JAT

ORDER

14 Pending before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
15 64) and Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (Doc. 81). Defendant
16 has filed a statement of facts supporting the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 65).
17 Plaintiff, James Eagle, has filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion for
18 summary judgment (Doc. 75) and a statement of facts in opposition to Defendant's
19 motion for summary judgment (Doc. 74). Defendant has also filed a reply in support of
20 the motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike Plaintiff's statement of facts
21 (Doc. 81). The parties appeared before the Court for oral argument on this matter on
22 September 11, 2013.

23 Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion to strike (Doc.
24 91) and Defendant has filed a reply in support of the motion to strike (Doc. 95). The
25 parties appeared before the Court for oral argument on the pending motions on
26 Wednesday, September 11, 2013. The Court now denies Defendant's motion to strike
27 and grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment for the following reasons.

28 **I. Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 81)**

1 As an initial matter, Defendant has filed a motion to strike certain statements of
2 fact in Plaintiff's statement of facts. (Doc. 81). Defendant requests that the Court strike
3 any factual statements premised on paragraphs 5 and 6 of Exhibit B (Doc. 74-1 at 42) to
4 Plaintiff's statement of facts because Exhibit B contains only conclusions and does not
5 cite actual facts (Doc. 81 at 1-3); that the Court strike Exhibit F to Plaintiff's statement of
6 facts (Doc. 74-1 at 51-62) and all factual contentions which rely on Exhibit F because
7 Exhibit F has not been authenticated (Doc. 81 at 4); that the Court strike immaterial facts
8 (*id.* at 5); and that the Court strike Plaintiff's contradicting facts not supported by the
9 record (*id.*).

10 However, the Court should consider evidence subject to potential hearsay
11 objections because it is inappropriate to focus on the admissibility of the evidence's form
12 at the summary judgment stage. *Fraser v. Goodale*, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003).
13 The focus at the summary judgment stage in the proceeding is the admissibility of its
14 contents. *Id.*; *see also Block v. City of L.A.*, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To
15 survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a
16 form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements of
17 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56."); *Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co.*, 953 F.2d
18 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1991) ("the nonmoving party need not produce evidence in a form that
19 would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.") (quotation marks and
20 citation omitted).

21 Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant's motion to strike and consider any
22 material facts presented by Plaintiff consistent with this standard. As the Court explains
23 below, some of the contradicting facts offered by Plaintiff are indeed conclusory
24 statements without evidentiary support. The Court will consider these statements of fact
25 on a case by case basis.

26 **II. BACKGROUND**

27 Plaintiff claims Defendant discriminated against him because of his age in
28 violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §

1 621, *et seq.* Plaintiff was born on August 12, 1944. (Doc. 65 at 9). Plaintiff was hired
2 by Bill Alexander Automotive Center (the “Dealership”) in Yuma, Arizona, in July 2002.
3 (*Id.*). After being hired, Plaintiff created the position of “Preferred Finance Director” and
4 “Leasing Manager” for himself with the Dealership’s approval. (*Id.*). It was rare for an
5 auto dealership to have a Preferred Finance Director position. (*Id.* at 11). As the
6 Preferred Finance Director/Leasing Manager, Plaintiff’s primary duty was to close lease
7 deals. (*Id.* at 10). While the Dealership had the capacity to close lease deals prior to
8 hiring Plaintiff, the Dealership did not have a designated employee acting as a Preferred
9 Finance Director/Leasing Manager until Plaintiff began working there. (*Id.* at 9). The
10 titles Preferred Finance Director and Leasing Manager were interchangeable at the
11 Dealership while Plaintiff filled this position. (*Id.*). In addition to closing lease deals,
12 Plaintiff’s other duties included oversight of the Dealership’s advertising, sales force
13 training, and assisting the General Sales Manager in conducting sales meetings at the
14 Dealership. (*Id.*). Plaintiff never directly supervised anyone while working at the
15 Dealership and he never worked in the service department. (Doc. 75 at 9).

16 Bill Alexander was the owner of the Dealership and the General Manager of
17 record (“GM”) when Plaintiff was hired and until Alexander’s death in October 2008.
18 (Doc. 65 at 2, 7). Alexander’s grandson, Ryan Hancock, was the acting General Manager
19 from 2002 through 2008. (*Id.* at 5). Hancock hired Plaintiff in 2002. (*Id.* at 9). In 2004,
20 Hancock hired T.R. Snow as the “Fleet Manager.” (Doc. 75 at 3). Hancock promoted
21 Snow to General Sales Manager in 2007. (*Id.*). As General Sales Manager, Snow was
22 Plaintiff’s supervisor. As a result, Plaintiff reported to Snow, Hancock, and Alexander in
23 2007 and 2008. (*Id.*).

24 The Dealership is an authorized Toyota dealership, authorized by Toyota Motor
25 Sales U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”). (*Id.* at 2). Toyota measures customer satisfaction with the
26 purchase of Toyota products and services from authorized Toyota dealerships. (*Id.*).
27 This customer satisfaction is tracked by Customer Service Index (“CSI”) scores at
28 authorized Toyota dealerships throughout the country. (*Id.*). Positive CSI scores are

1 important to Toyota. (*Id.* at 3).

2 From 2004 through 2008, the Dealership was in the bottom 10% of CSI scores for
3 sales in its region (that encompassed six states) and in the nation. (*Id.*). The Dealership
4 was also in the bottom 10% of CSI scores for service in its region and in the nation from
5 2005 through 2010. (*Id.* at 4).

6 Toyota requires that the GM of record at the Dealership meet distinct
7 qualifications. (*Id.* at 5). The GM of record is hired by the Dealership's owner but must
8 be approved by Toyota. (*Id.*). Toyota requires that the approved GM has full day-to-day
9 operational authority over the dealership they operate, including the final authority to
10 make personnel decisions. (*Id.* at 4, 8).

11 In December 2007, Toyota declined to approve Hancock as the GM of record for
12 the Dealership because of the Dealership's consistently low CSI scores. (*Id.* at 4). On
13 December 21, 2007, Toyota executives informed Alexander and Hancock that Alexander
14 would remain the GM of record for the Dealership. (*Id.* at 6). On January 9, 2008,
15 Toyota informed Alexander that should he ever be unable to perform the duties of GM
16 that Toyota could force the appointment of an individual with proven, successful, and
17 relevant experience to assume the GM position. (*Id.*). In January 2009, Hancock was
18 also required by Toyota to sign an "Investor Only" letter and return it to Toyota
19 confirming that he would not serve as the GM for the Dealership and specifically that he
20 would not run the Dealership on a day-to-day basis. (*Id.* at 7).

21 Alexander died in October 2008. (*Id.*). Upon Alexander's passing, Toyota
22 immediately sent a letter to Hancock informing him that he was not eligible to serve as
23 the GM for the Dealership and that he had 60 days to notify Toyota of a candidate for
24 GM. (*Id.*). Toyota further informed Hancock that the candidate for GM would need to
25 be evaluated by Toyota and approved. (*Id.*).

26 While working at the Dealership, Plaintiff functioned as one of the Dealership's
27 "closers," which was someone salespeople would bring difficult customers to in order to
28 close the deal. (Doc. 75 at 2). Throughout 2008 and through the beginning of 2009,

1 Plaintiff was the highest grossing salesman at the Dealership in twelve out of thirteen
2 months. (Doc. 74-1 at 51-62). During that time the Dealership employed between three
3 and ten salespeople. (*Id.*). The majority of salespeople that Plaintiff worked with were
4 under 40 years old, including: Dennis Loper, Dave Lehman, and Luis Arias. (Doc. 75 at
5 7).

6 At some point during Plaintiff's employment at the Dealership, employees began
7 making disparaging comments to Plaintiff. In an October 2008 sales meeting, attended
8 by members of the Dealership's sales team, Hancock made the statement, "These are my
9 guys. You, Dave [Lehman] you're young. These are my guys. This is my team. This is
10 what I want, all young guys around me. Sorry Eagle." (Doc. 75 at 4). Hancock also
11 made other discriminatory comments to Plaintiff on unidentified dates; Hancock called
12 Plaintiff an "old f**k" and said "He's too old," "I like young guys," "You're just old,
13 Eagle," and "Eagle is too old." (*Id.*). On unidentified dates, unidentified employees at
14 the Dealership also called Plaintiff "old f**k," "grandpa," "old motherf***er,"
15 "dinosaur," and suggested Plaintiff was getting Alzheimer's disease. (*Id.*).

16 In January 2009, Hancock hired Robert Santa Maria to be the GM of the
17 Dealership. (Doc. 65 at 8). Toyota met with Santa Maria and approved him to be the
18 GM of record. (*Id.*). Hancock and Toyota told Santa Maria that he was hired to improve
19 the CSI scores of the Dealership and that Santa Maria would have complete authority
20 over the day-to-day operations of the Dealership, including all personnel decisions. (*Id.*).
21 Toyota stressed to Santa Maria that he was in charge of the Dealership and that Hancock
22 was only the Investor. (*Id.*). Toyota also told Santa Maria that his number one priority
23 was to increase the Dealership's CSI scores. (*Id.* at 11). The Dealership agreement for
24 the Dealership specifically stated that Santa Maria was the Dealership's designated GM
25 and had full operational authority. (*Id.* at 10). Santa Maria began work as the GM on
26 January 28, 2009. (*Id.* at 9). As the GM, Santa Maria was Plaintiff's supervisor. (*Id.* at
27 11).

28 Santa Maria became acquainted with Plaintiff during his initial weeks working as

1 the GM. (*Id.* at 11). Prior to starting at the Dealership, Santa Maria had never heard of a
2 Preferred Finance Director position at any other dealerships. (*Id.*). Santa Maria
3 evaluated Plaintiff's compensation and felt that Plaintiff was overcompensated for the
4 services he provided for the Dealership. (*Id.*).

5 Santa Maria determined that to improve CSI scores, he needed to change the
6 culture and some key personnel at the Dealership in order to put the focus on customers
7 and employees. (*Id.* at 10). A week after starting work as the GM, Santa Maria began
8 making personnel changes. (*Id.* at 15). Santa Maria terminated the employment of the
9 Parts Manager, William Rivera on February 4, 2009. (*Id.*). Rivera was 28 years old
10 when he was fired. (*Id.*).

11 Santa Maria also found that the General Sales Manager Snow and Plaintiff had an
12 impact on the sales department. (*Id.* at 10). Plaintiff and Snow conducted training for the
13 sales personnel, Plaintiff was almost exclusively handling lease deals and he was in
14 charge of advertising. (*Id.*). In addition, due to the financial crisis throughout the
15 country in 2008 and 2009, the number of banks willing to finance car purchases and
16 leases began to decline and leasing at the Dealership also declined. (*Id.* at 12). Santa
17 Maria concluded that the Dealership did not need a dedicated "Preferred Financial
18 Director" with the sole function of writing leases because other employees at the
19 Dealership were capable of writing leases as well. (*Id.*). On March 2, 2009, Santa Maria
20 terminated the employment of Plaintiff and Snow. (*Id.* at 13). Snow was 33 years old
21 when he was fired. (*Id.* at 14). In April and October 2009 respectively, Santa Maria
22 terminated the employment of Service Advisor Jose Raymundo and Service Porter
23 Andres Garcia. (*Id.* at 15). Raymundo was 28 years old and Garcia was 22 years old
24 when each was fired respectively. (*Id.*). After Snow and Plaintiff were terminated,
25 employees at the Dealership expressed their happiness that Snow and Plaintiff were gone
26 because both parties allegedly contributed to a high-pressure sales environment and were
27 intimidating. (*Id.*).

28 By the end of 2009, the Dealership's CSI scores for sales had risen and were out

1 of the bottom 10% in the region and in the nation. (*Id.*). The Dealership's CSI scores
2 continued to improve in 2010 and 2011. (*Id.* at 16). By the end of 2010, the Dealership's
3 CSI scores for service had also improved and rose out of the bottom 10% in the region
4 and nation. (*Id.*).

5 In 2012, the Dealership was awarded the prestigious President's Award from
6 Toyota because of the Dealership's improved CSI scores. (*Id.*). The President's Award
7 is awarded by Toyota to outstanding dealerships each year that excel in all facets of their
8 operations. (*Id.*). Santa Maria accepted the award on behalf of the Dealership in 2012.
9 (*Id.*).

10 After being terminated, Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge against the
11 Dealership with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Doc. 74 at
12 23). In his first response to the EEOC on behalf of the Dealership, in August 2009, Santa
13 Maria stated that he terminated Plaintiff because Santa Maria had decided to eliminate
14 the "Preferred Finance Department." (*Id.*). In another response to the EEOC in October
15 2009, Santa Maria explained that Plaintiff was terminated because Santa Maria had
16 eliminated the position of Leasing Director. (*Id.*).

17 Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on June 7, 2011, alleging a claim of age
18 discrimination against Defendant. (Doc. 1). Following discovery, Defendant filed the
19 pending motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 81).

20 **III. DISCUSSION**

21 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against him because of
22 his age in violation of the ADEA. (Doc. 1 at 1). In the motion for summary judgment,
23 Defendant argues that there is no genuine dispute over the fact that Plaintiff was
24 terminated by the GM Santa Maria for legitimate reasons that had nothing to do with
25 Plaintiff's age. (Doc. 64 at 1). Therefore, Defendant contends that it is entitled to
26 summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (*Id.* at 3).

27 **A. Summary Judgment**

28 Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no

1 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
2 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
3 disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the
4 record,” or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
5 genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support
6 the fact.” *Id.* 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party
7 who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
8 to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
9 *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

10 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the
11 motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be
12 unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. *Id.* at 323. The burden then shifts to
13 the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. *Id.* The non-movant “must do
14 more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by
15 “com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
16 *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). In the summary judgment context, the
18 Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
19 *Ellison v. Robertson*, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).

20 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
21 defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
22 that there be no genuine issue of material fact. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S.
23 242, 247-248 (1986). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of
24 the case under the governing substantive law. *Id.* at 248. A material fact is “genuine” if
25 the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
26 party. *Id.*

27 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether
28 there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient

evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. *Id.* at 249-250. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, the judge may grant summary judgment. *Id.*

B. Age Discrimination Under the ADEA

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual [who is at least 40 years of age] . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). “We evaluate ADEA claims that are based on circumstantial evidence of discrimination by using the three-stage burden-shifting framework laid out in *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” *Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship*, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). “To establish a violation of ADEA under the disparate treatment theory of liability, [Plaintiff] ‘must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If [he does], the burden then shifts to [Defendant] to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate that [Defendant’s] alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory.’” *Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.*, 232 F.3d 1271, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co.*, 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Despite the burden shifting, the ultimate burden of proof remains always on the former employee[] to show that [Defendant] intentionally discriminated because of [his] age.” *Id.* at 1281.

A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination “need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment. This is because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry—one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.” *Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis*, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted); *see also McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp.*, 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In evaluating motions for summary judgment in the context of employment discrimination, we have emphasized the importance of zealously guarding an employee’s right to a full trial, since discrimination claims are frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the

1 evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”). Summary
2 judgment is not appropriate if a reasonable jury viewing the summary judgment record
3 could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in
4 his favor. *Davis v. Team Elec. Co.*, 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing *Cornwell*
5 *v. Electra Cent. Credit Union*, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2006)).

6 **1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case**

7 To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by circumstantial evidence,
8 Plaintiff must “demonstrat[e] that he was (1) at least forty years old, (2) performing his
9 job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) either replaced by substantially younger
10 employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances
11 otherwise ‘giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.’” *Diaz*, 521 F.3d at 1207
12 (quoting *Coleman*, 232 F.3d at 1281).

13 “The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title
14 VII and ADEA claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise
15 to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 889 (citing *Yartzoff v.*
16 *Thomas*, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990)); *see*
17 *also Sisco–Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist.*, 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991)
18 (“The amount [of evidence] that must be produced in order to create a prima facie case is
19 very little.”). Plaintiff need only offer evidence which “gives rise to an inference of
20 unlawful discrimination.” *Lowe v. City of Monrovia*, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985),
21 *as amended*, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986) (quotation omitted). “The prima facie case may be
22 based either on a presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth in
23 *McDonnell Douglas*, or by more direct evidence of discriminatory intent. In offering a
24 prima facie case, of course, a plaintiff may present evidence going far beyond the
25 minimum requirements.” *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 889 (citations omitted). “Establishment of
26 the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
27 discriminated against the employee.” *Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S.
28 248, 254 (1981).

1 The Court finds Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination
2 in this case. Plaintiff has met the first factor because the undisputed facts show that
3 Plaintiff is a member of the protected class because he was born on August 12, 1944.

4 To establish the second factor, that he was performing his job satisfactorily,
5 Plaintiff offers essentially one undisputed material fact as proof. Between February 2008
6 and January 2009 (twelve of the thirteen months leading up to Plaintiff's termination),
7 Plaintiff was the top grossing sales manager out of three to ten sales managers every
8 month except for one (April 2008) in which Plaintiff was the second highest grossing
9 sales manager. While satisfactory job performance is a broad term that can be judged by
10 myriad factors, the Court finds that because Plaintiff's job was essentially to sell cars, this
11 fact alone is enough to establish a prima facie case that Plaintiff performing his job
12 satisfactorily. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met his initial burden for this factor.

13 Plaintiff has met the third factor because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff
14 was discharged by Santa Maria on March 2, 2009.

15 Finally, with regard to the fourth factor, Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that he
16 was "replaced [] with a less qualified, younger employee" (Doc. 1 at 4), and Plaintiff's
17 EEOC charge also asserts that "[o]lder employees have been replaced with younger
18 people" (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Yet, Plaintiff admits that he was not actually replaced by a
19 younger employee, he contends that Defendant merely retained younger, less qualified
20 employees. (Doc. 75 at 10-11). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's theories of liability are
21 limited to theories he asserted in his Complaint and because Plaintiff only claimed he was
22 replaced by a younger employee, Plaintiff cannot pursue his claim now while admitting
23 he was not replaced. (Doc. 64 at 6) (citing *Coleman*, 232 F.3d at 1292).

24 The fourth factor in establishing a prima facie case is showing that an employer
25 "either" replaced the terminated employee with substantially younger employees with
26 equal or inferior qualifications "or discharged the employee under circumstances
27 otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination." *Diaz*, 521 F.3d at 1207
28 (emphasis added). Defendant's argument is premised on the argument that the "or" in

1 this factor stipulates two distinct theories of liability and Plaintiff only alleged the first
2 theory in both his Complaint and in his EEOC charge—that he was replaced. Defendant
3 bases this argument on *Coleman*. (Doc. 64 at 6).

4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in *Coleman* that where a plaintiff sets
5 forth one theory in the complaint and does not move to amend until summary judgment
6 proceedings, it is barred from proceeding on a new theory. *Coleman*, 232 F.3d at 1292.
7 In *Coleman*, employees suing under the ADEA changed their theory from disparate
8 treatment (which they had alleged in the complaint and relied on throughout discovery) to
9 disparate impact (which had never been raised before the summary judgment stage).
10 Though both disparate treatment and disparate impact are theories that are found in the
11 ADEA, the district court refused to allow the employees to rely on the new theory at the
12 summary judgment stage, reasoning that the employer was prejudiced by the lack of
13 disclosure regarding this theory. The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that “[a]fter
14 having focused on intentional discrimination in their complaint and during discovery, the
15 employees cannot turn around and surprise the company at the summary judgment stage
16 on the theory that an allegation of disparate treatment on the complaint is sufficient to
17 encompass a disparate impact theory of liability.” *Id.* at 1292-93.

18 Unlike *Coleman*, however, throughout this case Plaintiff has solely alleged a claim
19 under a theory of disparate treatment. Defendant’s interpretation of *Coleman* is also
20 overly broad. As another Court in the Ninth Circuit has explained,

21 *Coleman* does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff can
22 only proceed on those theories of liability raised in [his]
23 complaint. In fact, in *Coleman* the Ninth Circuit was
24 presented with the opportunity to adopt such a hard-and-fast
25 rule to that effect, yet declined to do so. Instead, the Ninth
26 Circuit held that even if a plaintiff failed to plead an
additional theory in [his] complaint, [he] could nonetheless
pursue that theory if [he] made it known during discovery of
[his] intention to pursue recovery under that theory.

27 *Gartner, Inc. v. Parikh*, CV 07-2039-PSG, 2008 WL 4601025, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14,
28 2008) (citing *Coleman*, 232 F.3d at 1294).

1 In *Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co.*, the Court of Appeals noted an even narrower fourth
2 factor and said all a plaintiff must prove to establish the fourth factor was that he was
3 “replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.”
4 Even when replacement was the only theory considered to establish a *prima facie* case
5 the Court of Appeals went on to explain that,

6 Proof of the replacement element is not always required,
7 however. Where the discharge results from a reduction in
8 work force, the plaintiff may show “through circumstantial,
9 statistical or direct evidence that the discharge occurred under
10 circumstances giving rise to an inference of age
11 discrimination.” [*Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 902 F.2d 1417,
12 1421 (9th Cir. 1990).] Such an inference can be established
by showing the employer had a “continuing need for his skills
and services in that his various duties were still being
performed.” *Id.*

13 *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 891. “The test for the *prima facie* case changes somewhat [] where a
14 discharge occurs in the context of a general reduction in the employer’s workforce. In
15 this context, circumstantial evidence other than evidence concerning the identity of a
16 replacement employee may also warrant an inference of discrimination. The reason for
17 this difference is that in most reduction-in-force cases no replacements will have been
18 hired.” *Diaz*, 521 F.3d at 1208 n. 2.

19 In this case, Plaintiff offers no evidence that he was replaced by a younger
20 employee. The evidence that Plaintiff does offer to establish the fourth factor and show
21 an inference of age discrimination are: 1) comments made by Hancock in 2008, when he
22 said “This is what I want, all young guys around me. Sorry Eagle,” “He’s too old,” “I
23 like young guys,” “You’re just old, Eagle,” “Eagle is too old,” “old f**k”; 2) that Loper,
24 Lehman, Arias, and Mike Mitchell were not fired even though they were younger and
25 less productive than Plaintiff; and 3) Plaintiff’s consistently higher gross sales numbers
26 than younger salespeople in the thirteen months leading up to his termination. The Court
27 finds this is enough circumstantial evidence to give rise to an inference of age
28 discrimination and establish the requisite *prima facie* case.

2. Defendant's Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reasons

“Once a *prima facie* case has been made, the burden of production shifts to the defendant, who must offer evidence that the adverse action was taken for other than impermissibly discriminatory reasons.” *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 889 (citing *Burdine*, 450 U.S. at 254). Defendant must “offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [Plaintiff’s] termination.” *Id.* at 892. Defendant explains that Plaintiff was fired because he was not satisfactorily performing his job and because his position at the Dealership was unnecessary and eliminated. (Doc. 64 at 7-9).

Defendant argues that whether or not Plaintiff was performing his job satisfactorily was reflected by the Dealership’s “terrible” sales performance shown by its consistently low CSI scores. (Doc. 64 at 4-5, 8-9). It is undisputed that CSI scores are a vital metric for judging the performance of a car dealership because these scores measure the customer satisfaction of the dealership. CSI scores are important to Toyota because it helps Toyota identify dealerships that need specific areas of improvement. Low CSI scores could result in the termination or nonrenewal of the Dealer Agreement with Toyota.

To establish his *prima facie* case, Plaintiff argued that even though the dealership’s CSI scores were low, CSI scores are determined for both the Dealership’s sales and service and he had nothing to do with the dealership’s service department. (Doc. 75 at 9). However, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff had an effect on the Dealership’s CSI scores for service. It is undisputed that “the Dealership was in the bottom 10% of the Denver Region and of the nation in CSI scores for sales from 2004 through 2008.” (Doc. 65 at 3 ¶ 1.10) (emphasis in original); *cf.* (Doc. 74 at 2 ¶ 10) (“Mr. Eagle admits paragraph 1.10 of Defendant’s Statement of Facts”). The dealership’s low CSI score for sales does not account for service. Indeed, the next fact in Defendant’s statement of facts, which Plaintiff also admits, distinguishes between the dealership’s CSI score in sales and CSI score based on service. *See* (Doc. 65 at 4 ¶ 1.11) (“The Dealership was in the bottom 10% of the Denver Regions and of the nation in CSI scores for service”).

1 from 2005 through 2010” (emphasis in original)). Thus, Defendant’s argument that
2 Plaintiff was terminated because of the Dealership’s low CSI scores for sales is a
3 legitimate explanation.

4 In establishing his *prima facie* case, Plaintiff also argued that he was not a
5 supervisor in the Dealership’s sales department and, therefore, the overall sales numbers
6 of the Dealership were not a reflection of his job performance. (Doc. 75 at 9). However,
7 Plaintiff admits that he managed the Dealership’s advertising, put together the
8 Dealership’s promotions, conducted the Dealership’s off-site sales, helped conduct
9 Dealership sales meetings, helped train the Dealership’s sales force, and was one of the
10 Dealership’s designated “closers” whom salespeople would bring difficult customers to
11 in order to close the deal. (*Id.* at 2). Accordingly, the undisputed facts show that
12 Plaintiff’s role in the sales department had at the very least an effect, if not a significant
13 impact on the Dealership’s sales performance. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s
14 explanation that the Dealership’s performance was a reflection of Plaintiff’s performance
15 is legitimate.

16 Defendant explains that the facts show Plaintiff was fired for his performance and
17 there is no evidence of discriminatory intent. Undisputed evidence shows that Santa
18 Maria was hired by Hancock and Toyota at the end of January 2009 and told that he was
19 hired to improve the Dealership’s consistently low CSI scores. Santa Maria began
20 making changes to personnel in February 2009. On March 2nd, Santa Maria started
21 making changes to the sales force. Santa Maria fired Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s direct
22 supervisor, the General Sales Manager Snow. Plaintiff was almost exclusively in charge
23 of lease deals and he was solely in charge of advertising. Plaintiff and Snow were in
24 charge of training the sales staff. Snow was in his early thirties when he was terminated.
25 Santa Maria also terminated the employment of three other employees in the service
26 department at the dealership in 2009. The three terminated employees in the service
27 department were less than thirty years old when they were fired.

28 Undisputed evidence that also supports the legitimacy of Defendant’s employment

1 decisions is shown by the fact that after Plaintiff and Snow were terminated the
2 Dealership's CSI scores dramatically improved. After Plaintiff and Snow's termination,
3 by the end of 2009, the Dealership's CSI scores for sales were out of the bottom 10% in
4 the region and in the nation; and the scores continued to improve throughout 2010 and
5 2011. By 2010, the Dealership's CSI scores for service were also out of the bottom 10%
6 in the region and in the nation. In 2012, the Dealership was awarded the prestigious
7 President's Award by Toyota in recognition of the Dealership's improvement in its CSI
8 scores and excellent performance in all facets of its operations. Santa Maria accepted the
9 award for the Dealership from Toyota.

10 Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff's unsatisfactory job performance was evinced
11 by Plaintiff's practice of using of high pressure sales tactics which also led to the low CSI
12 scores of the Dealership. (Doc. 64 at 8). Defendant contends that in order for Santa
13 Maria to change the culture and practices used at the Dealership to in turn raise the
14 Dealership's CSI scores that Santa Maria had to change the personnel at the Dealership
15 with the most impact on the sales force. The personnel at the Dealership with the most
16 impact on the sales force were Plaintiff and Snow, both of whom Santa Maria fired.

17 The second reason Defendant articulates for firing Plaintiff is that Plaintiff's
18 position at the Dealership was unnecessary. (*Id.* at 7). Defendant explains that Santa
19 Maria determined that employing a dedicated "Preferred Finance Director/Leasing
20 Manager" was unnecessary. Undisputed facts show that it was rare for a dealership to
21 employ a "Preferred Finance Director." It was a position that Plaintiff titled and
22 created on his own with the approval of the Dealership. Leading up to Plaintiff's
23 termination, leasing declined as a result of the financial crisis across the nation in 2008.
24 In 2008 and 2009 the number of banks willing to finance car purchases and leases also
25 declined. Plaintiff was not the only employee at the Dealership capable of handling
26 leases should the need arise. Thus, eliminating Plaintiff's position would not
27 significantly diminish the Dealership's ability to handle leases so it cannot be said that
28 terminating Plaintiff would have negatively impacted the Dealership. Therefore, this was

1 also a legitimate reason articulated by Defendant. Accordingly, while Plaintiff had duties
 2 involving sales in addition to his duties as “Preferred Finance Director/Leasing
 3 Manager,” the Court finds Defendant has articulated legitimate and non-discriminatory
 4 reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment as both a salesman and as the “Preferred
 5 Finance Director/Leasing Manager.”

6 **3. Plaintiff’s Proof of Pretext**

7 Because Defendant has offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
 8 Plaintiff’s termination, it has carried its burden of production, “and the presumptions
 9 created by the *prima facie* case[] disappear.” *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 892 (citation omitted).
 10 “This is true even though there has been no assessment of the credibility of [Defendant]
 11 at this stage.” *Id.* (citing *Burdine*, 450 U.S. at 254).

12 “The presumptions having dropped out of the picture, we are left with the ultimate
 13 question of whether [Plaintiff] has offered evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of
 14 fact to find that [Defendant] intentionally discriminated against him because of his age . .
 15 .” *Id.*

16 [I]n deciding whether an issue of fact has been created about
 17 the credibility of the employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons,
 18 the district court must look at the evidence supporting the
 19 *prima facie* case, as well as the other evidence offered by the
 20 plaintiff to rebut the employer’s offered reasons. And, in
 21 those cases where the *prima facie* case consists of no more
 than the minimum necessary to create a presumption of
 discrimination under *McDonnell Douglas*, plaintiff has failed
 to raise a triable issue of fact.

22 Thus, the mere existence of a *prima facie* case, based on
 23 the minimum evidence necessary to raise a *McDonnell*
Douglas presumption, does not preclude summary judgment.
 24 Indeed, in *Lindahl v. Air France*, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th
 25 Cir. 1991), we specifically held “a plaintiff cannot defeat
 summary judgment simply by making out a *prima facie* case.”
 26 “[The plaintiff] must do more than establish a *prima facie*
 case and deny the credibility of the [defendant’s] witnesses.”
 27 *Schuler v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co.*, 793 F.2d 1010, 1011
 28 (9th Cir. 1986). In response to the defendant’s offer of

1 nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff must produce
2 “specific, substantial evidence of pretext.” *Steckl v. Motorola,*
3 *Inc.*, 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). In other words, the
4 plaintiff “must tender a genuine issue of material fact as to
5 pretext in order to avoid summary judgment.” *Id.*

6 *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 890; *see also Coleman*, 232 F.3d at 1282 (“In response to [defendant’s]
7 offer of nondiscriminatory reasons, [plaintiff] must produce specific, substantial evidence
8 of pretext.”) (citations omitted)).

9 While the Court recognizes that the Ninth Circuit “require[s] very little evidence
10 to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case,” *Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i*, 40 F.3d
11 1551, 1564 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court still finds that Plaintiff has not offered “specific
12 [and] substantial evidence of pretext,” *Wallis*, 26 F.3d at 890. Plaintiff’s argument that
13 Defendant’s explanation is pretext is premised on two theories: 1) that Hancock still ran
14 the Dealership in spite of the fact that Santa Maria was the GM and that Hancock
15 discriminated against Plaintiff because of his age; and 2) that Santa Maria himself
16 discriminated against Plaintiff because of his age. Plaintiff essentially argues that the
17 evidence supporting these theories shows that the discharge occurred under
18 circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. (Doc. 75 at 14).

19 **a. No Evidence Shows Hancock ran the Dealership**

20 Plaintiff’s initial argument is that Hancock ran the Dealership and Hancock’s
21 pervasive use of discriminatory comments shows Defendant’s legitimate explanation is
22 merely pretext. (*Id.* at 14). It is undisputed that Hancock made five discriminatory
23 statements that included: “This is what I want, all young guys around me. Sorry Eagle,”
24 “He’s too old,” “I like young guys,” “You’re just old, Eagle,” “Eagle is too old,” “old
25 f**k”. Plaintiff’s pending claim is discrimination though and not hostile work
26 environment. To show discrimination, Plaintiff must show that the remarks were tied to
27 his termination either directly or indirectly. *Nesbit v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 994 F.2d 703, 705
28 (9th Cir. 1993).

 The only evidence Plaintiff has offered of Hancock’s supervisory role at the

1 Dealership is 1) that Hancock hired Santa Maria, and 2) that Plaintiff overheard Hancock
2 angrily talk about Santa Maria.

3 Plaintiff claims that he personally witnessed Hancock continue to participate in the
4 day-to-day operation of the Dealership after Santa Maria was hired, including supervising
5 Plaintiff. (Doc. 75 at 5). However, Plaintiff has offered only one fact to support this
6 claim. In answer to the question “[d]id you ever hear Ryan Hancock exercising
7 supervisory authority over Bob Santamaria [sic]?” Plaintiff explained that Hancock was
8 angry at one point with Santa Maria because Santa Maria was allegedly trying to run the
9 Ford store. Hancock then said to an unidentified party, “I don’t give a s**t what [Santa
10 Maria] said. I’ll run the store. I’ll show [Santa Maria] who runs the store.” (Doc. 74-1
11 at 39). In an attempt to clarify, the questioner asked Plaintiff “[w]hat store” Plaintiff
12 thought that Hancock was referring to and Plaintiff answered, “[t]he whole thing. He was
13 just in general.” (*Id.*).

14 However, undisputed evidence shows that Toyota requires that the GM of the
15 Dealership meet certain qualifications and that Toyota specifically rejected Hancock for
16 the GM position in December 2007 because of the Dealership’s low CSI scores. In
17 January 2008, Toyota informed Alexander that should he ever not be able to perform the
18 duties of GM that Toyota could force the appointment of an individual with proven,
19 successful, and relevant experience to assume the position of GM. In January 2008,
20 Hancock was required to sign an “Investor Only” letter for Toyota that confirmed
21 Hancock would not serve as the GM of the Dealership and that Hancock could not run
22 the Dealership on a day-to-day basis. After Alexander died in October 2008, Hancock
23 was again reminded by Toyota that he could not serve as the GM of the Dealership and
24 Hancock was told that any candidate for GM would need to be evaluated by Toyota.
25 Toyota requires that approved GMs be given full operational responsibility of the Toyota
26 dealership they operate.

27 In January 2009, Hancock hired Santa Maria as the GM. Toyota evaluated and
28 approved Santa Maria as the GM. Santa Maria was told by Hancock and Toyota that he

1 was hired to improve the consistently low CSI scores of the Dealership. Hancock and
2 Toyota also told Santa Maria that he would have complete authority over the day-to-day
3 operation of the Dealership, including personnel decisions. Toyota further stressed to
4 Santa Maria that he was in charge of the Dealership and that Hancock was only the
5 Investor. Pursuant to the agreement with Toyota, Santa Maria had full operational
6 control of the Dealership, including all authority for all personnel decisions. In February
7 and March 2009, when Santa Maria began making personnel changes to sales staff and
8 fired Plaintiff, he also terminated Snow, the significantly younger General Sales
9 Manager.

10 Given this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not offered specific and
11 substantial evidence of pretext. Plaintiff has not shown that Hancock was tied either
12 directly or indirectly to his termination. Plaintiff's evidence that Hancock ran the
13 Dealership is based on an unreasonable inference because it is only supported by the lone
14 conversation Plaintiff overheard that referred to the Ford store, an entirely separate
15 dealership from the one at issue in this case. Even when given the chance to clarify
16 "which store," Plaintiff's answer is still vague and is no more than Plaintiff's third hand
17 interpretation of a conversation between two other people. This is neither specific nor
18 substantial evidence, especially when compared to specific evidence showing that Santa
19 Maria was not beholden to do Hancock's bidding and that Toyota took great lengths to
20 ensure Hancock would have no supervisory authority at the Dealership.

21 Plaintiff disputes a number of material facts with the mere assertion that "after
22 Robert Santa Maria became the General Manager of the Dealership on January 28, 2009,
23 as the owner of the Dealership, Ryan Hancock continued to work at the Dealership and
24 exercise supervisory authority over the Dealership's employees, including Mr. Eagle"
25 citing Plaintiff's deposition (Exhibit A) and declaration (Exhibit B). (Doc. 74 at 4-26).
26 However, these "statements of fact" by Plaintiff are not facts and are only supported by
27 Plaintiff's conclusory statements throughout his deposition and declaration and the
28 conversation Plaintiff overheard.

1 The Court finds no reasonable juror could find that Hancock ran the Dealership
2 and forced Santa Maria to make personnel decisions based on the sparse evidence
3 Plaintiff has offered at this point. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not tendered a genuine issue
4 of material fact over whether or not Hancock actually ran the Dealership.

5 **b. No Evidence Shows Santa Maria Engaged in**
6 **Discrimination**

7 With regard to evidence of Santa Maria's discrimination, Plaintiff has also failed
8 to produce specific and substantial evidence. The only evidence of Santa Maria's
9 discrimination that Plaintiff offers is 1) that Santa Maria allegedly failed to stop
10 discriminatory comments by other employees and would just laugh when these comments
11 were made; 2) that Santa Maria made a discriminatory comment when he said he was
12 "surprised" that Plaintiff could "get out of bed"; and 3) that Santa Maria gave evolving
13 reasons for why the Dealership terminated Plaintiff.

14 Plaintiff alleges that Santa Maria would just laugh when employees would make
15 discriminatory remarks regarding Plaintiff's age and that by laughing Santa Maria
16 unlawfully ratified the harassment. (Doc. 75 at 15). However, turning to Plaintiff's
17 deposition where he makes this allegation, Plaintiff states that Santa Maria was present in
18 the room three to five times when other employees made discriminatory comments about
19 Plaintiff's age. (Doc. 74-1 at 21). Yet, when asked to explain, Plaintiff could only recall
20 a single instance where another employee made a comment. Plaintiff recalled, "[o]ut in
21 the service island, [when Santa Maria] was walking out. [Santa Maria] didn't say
22 anything, but he left. I want to say it was probably a couple of salesman. They were
23 commenting on—something was said. We got Eagle. He's the only guy. Santamaria
24 [sic] looked at me and laughed." (*Id.*).

25 The Court finds that this evidence is not specific enough to show pretext. While
26 Plaintiff claims three to five instances, he could only vaguely remember one instance
27 where Santa Maria was present when other employees were talking about Plaintiff. The
28 sole instance Plaintiff cites does not reference Plaintiff's age. The comment by the

1 unidentified employees is not even vaguely directed at a protected class and could have
2 been in reference to any number of things. The Court finds that there is no evidence that
3 Santa Maria failed to stop discriminatory comments by others nor is there evidence that
4 Santa Maria actively encouraged discriminatory comments by laughing at them.

5 Plaintiff also claims that Santa Maria made a discriminatory comment on one
6 occasion. (Doc. 75 at 15). Plaintiff recalls, “There was something in a sales meeting
7 when somebody walking in late. I said, ‘If I can be here, you can be here’ or something
8 like that. And Santamaria [sic] said something that was a comment like that. I can’t
9 remember what he said. ‘Surprised you can make it out of bed,’ or something. Some
10 comment. I don’t recall.” (Doc. 74-1 at 22).

11 The Court also finds that this evidence is not specific enough to show pretext.
12 Plaintiff clearly stated at numerous points in this statement that he could neither
13 remember nor recall what Santa Maria said. When Plaintiff tried to paraphrase what he
14 thought Santa Maria said, the only statement Plaintiff offers has no clear or even off
15 handed reference to age. There is no evidence that Santa Maria’s comment, “surprised
16 you could make it out of bed” is directed at a protected class. It was directed at Plaintiff
17 as an individual and could have meant anything.

18 Finally, Plaintiff argues that pretext is proven because Santa Maria offered
19 evolving reasons for his termination to the EEOC. (Doc. 75 at 13-14). Plaintiff also
20 argues that pretext is shown because Santa Maria’s articulated reasons to the EEOC are
21 not the same as the reasons articulated to the Court as they did not include Plaintiff’s
22 performance and the Dealership’s low CSI scores, Plaintiff’s high pressure sales tactics,
23 Plaintiff’s alleged inability to get along with his coworkers, Plaintiff’s alleged treatment
24 of customers, or the allegation that Plaintiff was overpaid. (*Id.* at 7, 14).

25 On August 25, 2009, the dealership submitted a letter to the EEOC signed by
26 Santa Maria stating that Plaintiff was terminated because of the “elimination of the
27 Preferred Finance Department.” On October 29, 2009, Santa Maria signed another letter
28 sent to the EEOC stating that Plaintiff was terminated because Santa Maria had decided

1 to eliminate “the position of Leasing Director.” (*Id.* at 14).

2 Plaintiff argues that the Dealership had no Preferred Finance Department, only a
3 Preferred Finance Director, therefore Santa Maria’s explanation on October 29th is
4 evidence of pretext. However, Plaintiff’s argument is essentially a distinction without a
5 difference. The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff created and coined the position of
6 Preferred Finance Director, that it was uncommon for dealerships to have a Preferred
7 Finance Director, that Plaintiff’s role was informal in that position, and that Plaintiff
8 functioned as the Preferred Finance Director/Leasing Director and these terms were
9 interchangeable. Given these facts the Court finds Santa Maria’s explanations to the
10 EEOC in his letters did not conflict, that any differences between them were *de minimis*,
11 and that they are not evidence of pretext.

12 The additional reasons Defendant articulated to the Court for firing Plaintiff are
13 also not proof of pretext. As explained, Defendant told the EEOC that Plaintiff was fired
14 because his position was eliminated, however, in articulating non-discriminatory reasons
15 for firing Plaintiff to the Court, Defendant argued that 1) Plaintiff’s position was
16 eliminated, and 2) that Plaintiff’s performance contributed to the Dealership’s low CSI
17 scores. (Doc. 64 at 7). Plaintiff raises the question of whether additional, but compatible
18 reasons articulated to the Court by a defendant employer during litigation, that were not
19 articulated to the EEOC by a defendant when initially asked why a claimant was fired, is
20 evidence in itself of pretext.

21 Courts have consistently held that this is not evidence of pretext. The Ninth
22 Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[s]imply because an explanation comes after the
23 beginning of litigation does not make it inherently incredible.” *Lindahl v. Air France*,
24 930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing *Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Grp.*, 892 F.2d 1434,
25 1438 (9th Cir. 1990)). In *Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc.*, the defendant employer gave one
26 reason for its decision not to promote the plaintiff to the EEOC and later gave additional
27 reasons. 260 F.3d 727, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
28 employer’s changing reasons for not promoting her were evidence of pretext. *Id.* at 733.

1 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had not shown pretext merely
2 because the defendant “supplemented its explanations in the context of EEOC charges
3 and litigation.” *Id.* The Court of Appeals explained that “there has been no retraction of
4 any of [defendant’s] reasons for failing to promote [plaintiff] nor are any of [defendant’s]
5 reasons inconsistent or conflicting. Thus, [plaintiff] has failed to demonstrate that
6 [defendant’s] legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to promote her to beauty
7 director were pretextual.” *Id.* at 733-34; *see also Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp.*, 113
8 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, in context of retaliation, that the presence of
9 “shifting” or different justifications for an adverse action is not sufficient to defeat
10 summary judgment when those justifications “are not incompatible”).

11 Similar to *Johnson*, in this case Defendant has not given incompatible nor even
12 shifting reasons for its conduct. Defendant has merely supplemented its explanations in
13 the context of EEOC charges and litigation. In addition, Plaintiff’s use of high pressure
14 sales tactics is not a separate reason for firing Plaintiff; it is merely a part of Defendant’s
15 argument regarding Plaintiff’s performance and Plaintiff’s effect on the Dealership’s low
16 CSI scores. *See* (Doc. 64 at 8). Further, nowhere in Defendant’s motion for summary
17 judgment or in its reply does Defendant argue that Plaintiff was fired due to Plaintiff’s
18 inability to get along with his coworkers, Plaintiff’s treatment of customers, or the
19 allegation that Plaintiff was overpaid. These factual allegations appear in Defendant’s
20 statement of facts only. (Doc. 65 at 12 ¶ 6.20, 11 ¶¶ 6.8, 6.9, 6.10). Even if Defendant
21 had articulated these as additional non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff, as
22 discussed above, this would not be evidence in and of itself of pretext as none of these
23 reasons are incompatible with the reasons given.

24 Considered individually, Plaintiff has failed to offer specific evidence of pretext
25 and taken together Plaintiff has also failed to offer substantial evidence of pretext that
26 shows Defendant’s reasons for terminating Plaintiff were discriminatory. The Court is
27 required to construe all *disputed* facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
28 party. *Ellison*, 357 F.3d at 1075. However, Plaintiff has only offered disputing

1 conclusions and he has not offered disputing facts. All of the evidence that Plaintiff has
2 offered is merely colorable and is not significantly probative. Accordingly, The Court
3 finds no reasonable juror could find based on the evidence presented that the Dealership,
4 through Santa Maria's actions, unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff because of his
5 age.

6 **III. CONCLUSION**

7 Based on the foregoing,

8 **IT IS ORDERED** that Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is denied.


9 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
10 (Doc. 64) is granted.

11 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in
12 favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, with Plaintiff to take nothing.

13 **IT IS FINALLY ORDERED** that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

14 Dated this 17th day of September, 2013.

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James A. Teilborg
Senior United States District Judge